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Abstract 
 
During the past three decades the global oil market has seen significant price 
volatility. The literature has not sufficiently analysed the cross-country effect of the 
recent episode of price instability. Previous studies have either not considered this 
period or have not utilised panel data techniques and therefore have not provided a 
comparative analysis of developed and developing countries. This paper explores the 
income and price elasticities between these two country groups and the implication of 
the results. We use a panel data analysis accounting for income and price asymmetry 
with dynamic fixed-effects methodology to separate panels for developed and 
developing countries for the period 1980-2012. Sixteen countries are included in this 
analysis which account for over 65% of total global oil consumption. Particular focus 
is on the income and substitution effects. The results indicate heterogeneous response 
to oil price shocks. Developing countries have an income effect 6.3 times stronger 
than developed countries. The substitution effect in developed countries is 2.1 times 
stronger than in developing countries. Policy recommendations include the pursuing 
of oil-efficiency improving technology, and ensuring that regional consumption 
pattern variations are considered in policy formation.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Global energy consumption is valued at around $3.65 trillion annually, making up 
approximately 5 percent of global GDP (BP, 2014; World Bank, 2014). More than one-third 
of world energy use is from oil, more than any other fuel (Rubin, 2012). Especially, oil as a 
transit fuel is of paramount importance for the economies worldwide. The volatility of global 
oil prices is, therefore, widely viewed as a source of concern for the world economy. At the 
same time, we have witnessed rapid economic growth in emerging economies and the rising 
living standards in these countries has seen a strong increase in oil usage. The developing 
countries are climbing the ‘energy ladder’ and moving to industrial enterprise. 
 The price of oil is important for most economic activities. Rubin (2012, p. 33) states 
an oil shock can “deep-six” an economy, as other consumption suffers as the effect of high oil 
prices is transmitted to the wider economy. Historical oil price shocks were caused primarily 
by supply disruptions and are strongly correlated with major geopolitical disturbances 
(Hamilton, 2003). Baumeister and Kilian (2016) give a recent review of previous oil price 
shocks. In the 2007-2008 price increase, no major war or instability is attributed to the shock. 
In fact supply remained constant (BP, 2014). The main cause suggested was a shock to 
demand. Hamilton (2009) postulated the cause as a classic shortage situation. The increased 
global demand required significant supply increases to sustain the pre-shock price level. This 
was not experienced and the primary issue was scarcity due to a demand shock. 
The distribution of oil consumption is also changing. Demand in China is expected to 
surpass the US in 2029 and non-OECD Asian demand is expected to grow by six million-
barrels per day through to 2030 (BP, 2013). In contrast, in OECD countries, demand fell 
between 2006-08 with the price increases suspected to have played a role (Wurzel et al., 
2009). Yet the disparate consumption pattern between developing and developed countries is 
only scarcely analysed. A hypothesis is that the elasticities of income and price vary between 
developed and developing countries. Consideration of elasticities is taken by previous papers 
e.g. Gately and Huntington (2002); Hamilton (1983). 
This paper analyses the oil consumption effects of developed and developing countries 
during the period of an oil price shock. We use two cross-country panels which enable the 
comparison of consumption patterns between the two country groups (Appendix 1). We also 
use decomposition of the price and income series to account for asymmetric effect of these on 
consumption. In developing countries demand is expected to be fuelled by economic 
expansion (income effect), whereas, in developed economies, the substitution effect plays a 
larger role. Price elasticity of demand for oil should vary between the two panels. The period 
of analysis is 1980-2012, which provides a wide coverage of oil price instability and 
considers a more up to date panel than has previously been published. 
 The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 reviews the literature on the oil market 
and the development in estimation techniques. Section 3 considers the driving forces of an oil 
price shock and analyses their significance in the 2007-08 price shock. Section 4 sets out the 
methodology which underpins the analysis undertaken. Section 5 presents and interprets the 
results and establishes policy implications. Section 6 is conclusions. 
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2. Previous Studies of Oil Price and Consumption 
 
The literature surrounding the economics of the oil market has evolved considerably 
since the 1970’s. Studies initially sought to establish how oil consumption and other 
macroeconomic indicators were interrelated. Since the late 1980’s, the use of asymmetric 
decomposition has been applied however there is varied support for its relevance. Newer 
studies have focused more on the developing economies and their growing energy demands. 
For example, Ratti and Vespignani (2015; 2013) found that increased liquidity in developing 
countries such as China and India had a large effect on real oil price increases. 
A cross-country panel data analysis can aid understanding of global consumption 
patterns. However, due to the proximity of the recent oil shock there is a scarcity of literature 
investigating its economic impact. 
Hamilton (1983) in his seminal work discussed the relationship with oil consumption 
and the wider economy. The paper highlights that all US recessions are preceded by an oil 
shock, where typically an increase in oil prices is followed 3-4 quarters later with a shock to 
domestic output. The study illustrated one of the first explicit relationships between oil and 
the lagged transmission to the economy and used causality testing to establish that the oil 
price was a key factor in the signalling of recession. Numerous studies following Hamilton 
(1983) have found a relationship between oil consumption and variables such as income, 
inflation, and exchange rates. Burbidge and Harrison (1984) find that during the period 1962-
1981 in Canada, Japan, West Germany, USA and UK a shock of one-deviation to oil price 
leads to a rise in wages and inflation. They also found a significant decline in industrial 
production (a proxy for growth) following the shock in the US and UK though the effect is 
less significant in other countries. 
Despite these findings the macroeconomic relationship has been questioned. Mork 
(1989) noted that in the period investigated in Hamilton’s study all price movements were 
positive and questioned if the relationship would hold in periods of price decline. Through 
specifying separate variables for price increases and decreases, Mork mirrors the results of 
Hamilton (1983) during price increases. However, for price declines the result is statistically 
insignificant. Consequently, only positive price changes appear to transmit to the US 
economy. One must consider if such results would also hold for developing economies. 
The asymmetry of oil prices was investigated using a Koyck (1954) lag-demand 
function with an additional price and/or income decomposition term in Gately and Huntington 
(2002). Results for OECD countries echo the findings of Mork (1989) - that price increases 
have greater effect on demand for oil than price decreases. Therefore failure to account for 
price asymmetry may bias estimations of demand. OECD countries experience an income 
response, which is “dramatically different from its effect in the developing countries” (Gately 
and Huntington, 2002, p. 16). 
Indeed, the global effect may be negligible but that is a net effect. Comparison of 
developing versus developed economies yields different results. Rubin (2012) considers in the 
present scenario where oil demand is outstripping supply to be a ‘zero-sum’ situation. The 
analysis shows that emerging economies are price insensitive to oil in comparison to the 
industrialised economies. In part this is attributable to China and India experiencing large 
increases in income. This is due to what he describes as a “transformational development in 
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the way life is lived” (Rubin, 2012, p. 142). It is argued that as the living standards change the 
income elasticity will be nearing unity. 
There is a gap in the literature on economic impact of oil price shocks in developing 
countries. Tang et al. (2010) consider the Chinese economy, and observed that a rise in oil 
price leads to an increase in inflation and interest, but a negative effect on output and 
investment. The authors highlight the price controls and that they prevent the market from 
operating. Nonetheless, China reacts to price shocks, however this is significantly dampened 
as a result of price controls. They show that price elasticity of demand for energy is very low 
in the short-term, but in the longer term the consumption of energy is more sensitive to higher 
prices. 
A number of studies have calculated demand elasticities. Cooper (2003) estimates the 
price elasticity of demand for 23 countries in the period 1971-2000 and established the 
demand for oil to be price-inelastic in the short term and ranging from -0.016 (Finland) to -
0.109 (Iceland). In the long run countries experience greater responsiveness to price. Cooper 
does not consider asymmetric decomposition. Dargay (1992) looked at the UK elasticities in 
the period 1960-1990. Price elasticities were found to react significantly to the 1979-81 oil 
price rise, with a short-run elasticity of -0.5 deviating from a mean elasticity of -0.1. 
Nonetheless, the period saw great increases in energy efficiency. The study notes there would 
need to be a large price rise to incite such changes in energy demand. One could consider if 
this has been the case in the recent price shock. 
 A study by the IMF demonstrated the economic transmission of an unexpected $5 
increase in oil prices using the global economic model MULTIMOD to establish the effects. 
It showed that the price shock would cause a 0.3 per cent decline in global output in the two 
years after the event and the effect would be 0.4 per cent in the developed economies of the 
USA and European Union (IMF, 2001). This indicates a difference in developed economies 
response which could be attributed to greater reliance on energy intensive technology and a 
slower rate of adjustment. 
According to Fisher-Vanden et al. (2004) China has experienced energy efficiency 
gains since its economic liberalisation in the 1970’s. The scope for efficiency gains is present 
in a developing nation, as manufacturing processes have not yet reached maturity. They report 
a gain of 30 per cent in efficiency of oil products, and to an extent attribute this to rising 
energy costs. Hang and Tu (2007) validate the results through elasticities, noting pre-1995 oil 
price elasticity was -0.544 and post-1995 at -0.059; confirming the declining ability to adjust 
for prices as the ability for further energy efficiency gains approaches a minima. The makeup 
of the Chinese economy as a newly industrialising nation could have caused a disparity from 
industrialised economies and consequently may react uniquely to an oil price shock. 
Hamilton (2009) considers the recent oil price shock in the United States through a 
comprehensive theoretical and empirical analysis of the recent price shock. It argued that 
demand was the main driving factor in the recent episode, yet this was multiplied due to 
speculative activity. It is estimated that the increase in oil prices caused real US GDP growth 
to be 0.7 per cent lower than expected during 2007Q4 - 2008Q3. A main cause of price rise is 
attributed to increased demand from developing countries, yet Hamilton does not analyse 
these nations. 
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Aastveit et al. (2012) examines the effect of the price shock on a global scale. They 
find that different geographical regions have varying responses to oil shocks, with the 
developed economies suffering greater negative shocks. They report that European and US 
economic activity is permanently reduced by an oil shock but in emerging economies activity 
falls to a lesser degree and in some cases a temporary increase in activity is experienced 
following a supply shock. However, the approach used is time-series and not a cross-country 
pooled approach, hence a shortcoming in the literature exists. 
 
3. Determination of Oil Price 
 
 Oil prices during the period of study have seen great volatility, entering into what 
could be regarded as the third epoch of crude oil pricing (Dvir and Rogoff, 2010). Figure 1 
illustrates the structural breaks in oil pricing since 1861. Epoch I is characterised by price 
instability as the new discovery of oil is commercialised and unsteady supply is prevalent. 
Epoch II is the era of ‘cheap’ energy, steady prices, and the formalisation of the oil market 
resulted in more stable prices. In Epoch III, the market experienced high levels of volatility. 
There is a significant peak in 1986 following a reversal of the oil industry shock at the turn of 
the 1980’s. The introduction of formula netback pricing in 1986 linked the production sale 
price to a crude oil benchmark price (Downey, 2009) and could be seen to have remedied the 
issue of mispricing. The 1980 price shock was followed by a return to stability, but this was 
soon upturned by the price shock in the 2000’s. 
The 2007-2008 price shock is of particular interest to this study. The real price of oil 
in 2008 was the highest since 1864. There are different explanations of this rapid surge in 
prices; the main theories are focused around disequilibrium in supply and demand (Cantore et 
al., 2012). Emerging economies are increasing their demand for oil; while advanced 
industrialised economies are reducing consumption (Rubin, 2012). Nonetheless, global oil 
consumption is increasing year-on-year (BP, 2013). The 2007-2008 shock is primarily 
characterised by a rapid increase in demand as opposed to a supply shock. This is in stark 
contrast to previous oil shocks (Hamilton, 2009). The remainder of this chapter we follow the 
framework of Cantore et al. (2012) to examine the key factors in the 2008 price shock. 
The global supply of oil is deemed not to be a limiting factor in meeting projected 
demand till 2035 (IEA, 2012). According to the BP Statistical Review of World Energy in the 
past decade global proved reserves have increased by 26 per cent; and the R/P ratio1 has 
increased to 52.9 years from 48.3 years (BP, 2014). The global proven reserves has arisen in 
70 percent of cases from revisions to estimations of already discovered fields. As technology 
improves a high recoverable rate is achievable (IEA, 2012). New fields are no longer solely 
conventional oil. Technological advances and higher energy prices have led to extraction of 
tar sands, tight oil, and deep-water drilling operations (Rubin, 2012) and offshore oil in the 
Artic has been described as the “final frontier” (IEA, 2012, p. 110). 
 
 
                                                 
1 R/P ratio is the “reserves-to-production” ratio and represents the length of time production could 
continue based on the current reserves and production rate. 
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Figure 1: Historical Prices 1861-2012 separated into three epochs. 
Data Source: BP (2014) 
 
 As previously conjectured, the 2007-2008 oil shock was the result of disequilibrium in 
the market fundamentals and not due to a supply shock as in previous price shocks (Hamilton, 
2009). Consideration of output levels by OPEC and non-OPEC countries highlights a stalling 
of production during the period 2004-2008 in comparison to the forecast. Kaufmann (2011) 
hypothesises that the halt to production in non-OPEC countries caused a reduction in OPEC 
spare capacity. Production hiatus from non-OPEC producers was unexpected as Kaufmann 
(2011) reports the US Energy Information Administration expected that non-OPEC supply 
would increase by approximately 9 million barrels daily (EIA, 2005). A slowdown in supply 
would lead to a shortage and a rise in prices. 
During the oil price shock some global events influenced the supply of oil causing 
negative supply shocks. Table 1 outlines the main global events. However, the principal trend 
has not been one of supply reduction but rather has been a failure to increase production 
levels (Hamilton, 2009). Saudi Arabia has an influential position as the world’s largest crude 
oil reserves (BP, 2014). The Kingdom maintains crude reserves which have compensated the 
global supply in times of supply interruptions (Huntington et al., 2012). Yet, the Saudi 
production was 850,000 barrels a day lower in 2007 than in 2005 (Hamilton, 2009). 
 Since the 1980’s global oil consumption has increased at a staggering rate. There has 
been a doubling in oil demand from non-OECD countries since 1980, representing an 
additional 24 million barrels of oil a day (BP, 2014). Figure 2 shows the compounding growth 
of non-OECD demand. Petrie (2011) estimate an additional 1.4 million barrels per day on 
average will be demanded until 2015. However, in recent years, the OECD countries are seen 
to be reducing oil demand. This is especially evident between 2005 and 2009 indicating 
potential differences in elasticity of demand between the two country groups. 
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Table 1: Geopolitical disturbances and their impact on supply 
Source: Hamilton (2009, 2011) and BP (2014) 
Date Event Impact on Supply 
2001-onwards 
 
2003 
 
 
2005 
 
 
2006-08 
War on Terror 
 
Venezuela Unrest 
 
 
Gulf of Mexico Hurricanes 
 
 
Nigerian Conflict 
Iraq war cut 2.2 MBD during April-July 2003 
 
General strike cut supply for two months by 2.1 
MBD on previous year 
 
Reduction of 0.064 MBD on previous year 
Damage to offshore oil platforms  
 
Cut of 0.5 MBD during turmoil  
 
  
Decomposition of the recent oil price shock reinforces the importance of demand from 
developing countries. It is estimated that the emerging markets added 55 dollars in real terms 
to the peak price of oil in 2008 (Aastveit et al., 2012). Without reduced demand from 
developed countries the price would have risen even higher. Countries have heterogeneous 
tolerance to oil prices and are able to tolerate oil price rises to a certain point, beyond which 
they will adjust consumption patterns. Table 2 shows the estimates of this price. Despite the 
reliance on oil in the short term as experienced in developing countries, the EMEA (Europe, 
Middle East, and Africa) tolerate the highest prices. Therefore, the reductions in demand from 
developed countries over the price shock could be due to factors such as energy efficiency or 
substitution to other forms of energy. 
Economic growth is assumed to have a linear relationship with per capita oil demand 
ceteris paribus (Huntington et al., 2012). Galli (1998) observes a correlation between energy 
use and economic growth in non-OECD countries, but the converse is observed in OECD 
countries. However, recent studies have estimated that the linear relationship for developing 
countries still holds. This is explained by increasing energy intensity during economic 
development (Benthem and Romani, 2009). The 2007-2008 price shock is often regarded to 
be result of a demand shock. Indeed, development in non-OECD countries has been extensive 
and is expected to have contributed to increased oil consumption. Yet, one must consider if 
different countries have different experiences to the recent price shock. According to Kilian 
and Hicks (2009), unexpected growth in demand would have been a major contributing factor 
in explaining the recent price shock. 
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Figure 2: Annual change in oil consumption OECD vs. non-OECD countries. 
Data Source: BP (2014) 
 
Table 2: Peak tolerable oil price. 
Source: Petrie (2011) 
Location Peak Price (Barrel USD) 
US 
Eurozone 
Emerging Asia 
Latin America 
EMEA 
145 
120-130 
120-130 
130-140 
150+ 
 
 
4. Methodology 
4.1 Methodological Advancements 
 
Energy consumption models came to the forefront following the oil crisis of the 
1970’s. A key study by Pindyck (1979) analysed global energy demand and estimated 
demand models for different oil products. Pindyck recognises the issue of data availability 
and reliability in developing countries. Consequently a simple log-linear model for price and 
income incorporating a lag term to account for the dynamic adjustment is employed. The use 
of a lagged term overcomes the potential model breakdown in periods of unstable energy 
prices (Westoby and Pearce, 1984). The model postulated by Pindyck (1979) has been used in 
many estimations of income and price elasticity of oil (e.g., Dargary, 1992; Gately and 
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Huntington, 2002; Cooper, 2003). Pindyck found that developing countries have high 
income-elasticity but low price-elasticity, thus economic growth fuels demand for energy and 
predicts that higher prices would impede growth prospects. This early paper recognises that 
energy usage is strongly correlated to the economic growth rate. 
The development of econometric analysis enabled the application of pooled models 
and provided a better understanding of demand patterns as the use of a pooled data model can 
substantially increase the efficiency of an econometric model. Adelman (1984, p. 5) suggests 
that the global oil market is “one great pool.” Baltagi and Griffin (1997) pooled data for 
gasoline demand for 18 OECD countries and establish that pooling data sets increases the 
model efficiency especially over a longer period. However, as their data is across a set of 
comparable countries, OECD nations, one must consider if the pooled data model would work 
across a more global data set. 
 Fawcett and Price (2012) use a global pooled model with a more heterogeneous group 
of countries during the period 1984-2009 to provide a robust estimation. In order to establish 
the differences in groups of countries, they run cross-country panel data models for G7, 
remaining OECD, developing Asia and Latin America. Estimation of different panels can 
reduce the cross sectional heterogeneity which arise from pooling dissimilar economies 
following Pesaran et al. (1995). This study does not undertake asymmetry decomposition and 
therefore the effect of the shock is not established. 
Despite the amass of research to date, there has been little research which considers 
specifically what effect the 2007-08 oil shock had on countries with varied levels of 
development. Research that encompasses the period of the price shock is limited and only 
considers a time-series model, for example, Aastveit et al. (2012). The literature has not yet 
considered an asymmetric decomposition during the recent period of unstable pricing. 
 
4.2 Conceptual Model 
 
Considering previous research the most efficient modelling technique is to follow the 
conceptual ideas of Gately and Huntington (2002), van Benthem and Romani (2009), and 
Fawcett and Price (2012). Not only does the small number of variables increase the likelihood 
of data availability in developing countries, it also allows the results of study to be compared 
to previous research. Therefore, it is assumed oil demand can be represented as: 
 
 𝐷𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑓(𝑌𝑖,𝑡, 𝑃𝑡 , 𝜃𝑖) + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 (1) 
 
Table 3 highlights the variables to be used and provides a summary of the symbols 
which will be employed in this paper. The dependent variable of per-capita oil demand is 
employed to account for the natural requirement of energy due to the size of the population. 
As noted previously, population growth is one of the key drivers of oil demand (Petrie, 2011). 
Consequently, a considerable number of studies model per-capita oil demand (Pindyck, 1979; 
Cooper, 2003; Fawcett and Price, 2012). Modelling demand as the dependent variable in 
logarithmic form provides elasticities of demand. 
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Table 3: Variables and symbols used 
Variable Symbol Description Data Source 
Demand 
 
 
Income 
 
 
Price 
 
 
Country 
 
Random Error 
Di,t 
 
 
Yi,t  
 
 
Pt 
 
 
𝜃𝑖  
 
𝜀𝑖,𝑡  
Natural logarithm of per-capita oil demand, in 
country i in year t 
 
Natural logarithm of GDP per-capita (current 
US$), in country i in year t 
 
Natural logarithm of the real price of a barrel 
of oil 
 
Country fixed effect variable 
 
Random stochastic error term 
 BP (2014) 
 
 
World Bank (2014) 
 
 
BP (2014) 
 
 
N/A 
 
N/A 
 
 We consider the effect of oil demand during a period of price shock. Accordingly, a 
measure of oil price is included in the models. This study uses for 1980-1983 Arabian Light 
prices and from 1984-2012 Brent spot prices are employed. The panel assumes the price of oil 
to be exogenous to each country. Therefore no individual country ‘pump’ oil prices are  
considered which helps avoid the problem of endogeneity. Fawcett and Price (2012) utilise 
this assumption to combat the downward biased price elasticities as suggested by Kilian and 
Murphy (2010). Oil prices are expected to have a negative relationship with demand, 
consistent with demand theory. 
The income variable is measured as the gross domestic product (GDP) per capita and 
provides a cross-country comparison of relative wealth. Data is obtained from the World 
Bank and the variable is calculated as current US dollar prices to account for inflationary 
differences. In a review of oil price elasticity studies, it is found most major studies have 
employed an income term using GDP or GNP per capita (Hoffman, 2012). 
 
4.3 Model Specification 
 
As specification can significantly adjust the parameters obtained (Dahl, 1993), a 
number of forms will be estimated. 
4.3.1 Static and Dynamic Linear Models 
A panel data model approach based on the work of Gately and Huntington (2002) is 
employed in this study. Initially, the relationship is to be estimated as: 
 
 𝐷𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 +  𝛼1𝑌𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼2𝑃𝑡 + 𝜃𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 (2) 
 
The simple nature of this specification enables the elasticities of income and price to 
be estimated with ease as: 
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 𝜖𝑌 = 𝛼1  and 𝜖𝑃 = 𝛼2 (3) 
 
Income elasticity estimates the responsiveness of oil demand to economic growth rate. 
Price elasticity is expected to be negative. As the price of the commodity rises, demand theory 
suggests consumption will fall. Developed countries are more likely to be sensitive to prices 
than developing countries as they are more mature in their energy profile. 
The addition of a lagged dependent variable for one period allows for estimation of 
long-term price elasticity as it considers the speed of adjustment to price and income changes. 
The addition of a lagged term gives a dynamic model that can “provide robust forecasts” 
(Bhattacharyya and Timilsina, 2009, p. 44). Dynamic models can account for psychological, 
technological and institutional factors. The oil market is subject to effects of the same factors. 
Psychological effects occur due to inertia in demand. Technology needs time to adapt to price 
changes due to the widespread use of oil. Institutional obligations in the form of futures 
contracts influence future demand. Short-run elasticities will therefore be lower than the long-
run counterparts. The addition of a Koyck-lag to the demand term as a lagged dependent 
variable specifies the elasticities to represent the short term (Koyck, 1954). The dynamic 
model is: 
 
 𝐷𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑌𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼2𝑃𝑡 + 𝛾𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜃𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 (4) 
 
The addition of the lag to equation (2) enables more flexibility as it accounts for 
adjustments occurring overtime. The lagged term does however assume that the adjustment 
speed for both price and income is equal. In order to estimate the long run elasticity for 
equation (4), we divide the short-term elasticities by 1 − 𝛾 (van Benthem and Romani, 2009). 
4.3.2 Asymmetric Decomposition 
Some studies highlight the need to consider asymmetric response or imperfect price-
reversibility (Mork, 1989; Hogan, 1993; Gately, 1993). A pooled model for the OECD oil 
demand rejected the use of a symmetric model over the period 1966-1990 (Hogan, 1993). 
Hogan notes that during the sharp drop in prices in 1986, one could expect a much larger 
demand increase than experienced. We expect a similar result following the 2008 price fall. 
Gately and Huntington (2002) illustrate the expected results for demand response for both 
symmetric and asymmetric reactions. Using real price of oil versus oil demand per capita over 
the period 2004-2012, the diagrams in Figure 4 resemble the stylised functions illustrated in 
Gately and Huntington (2002) and show the evidence to proceed with the asymmetric 
decomposition. 
Decomposition of price into three monotonic series follows a method used in 
agricultural commodity analysis in Gately (1993) noting that prior to this approach, structural 
breaks were used which have less explanatory power. Asymmetric price effects also control 
for instances of technological improvement and acts as proxy for energy saving technological 
change (van Benthem and Romani, 2009). We use a similar decomposition as in Gately 
(1993). We expect to find greater response to prices rises than to price decreases. Gately and 
Huntington (2002) undertake a decomposition of income to consider asymmetry to income 
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changes. This is of interest in this paper due to the occurrence of the global financial crisis 
during the period of study. 
In order to estimate asymmetries a decomposition of the price and income is 
undertaken. In order to present the concept of variable decomposition the term X will be used. 
In our study X can represent either price (P) or income (Y). The technique can be applied to 
any time series independent variable. We decompose in logarithmic form: the cumulative sum 
of increases in the maximum value, the cumulative sum of decreases (cuts) in the variable and 
the cumulative sum of sub-maximum increases (recoveries) in the variable. In order to 
establish the decomposition, the annual change in the variable is calculated. The base year is a 
given and is indicated as X1 which in this study is 1980.  
 
The variables in the decomposition are defined as:  
 
Xmax, t  = cumulative series maximum rises in the logarithmic value of the variable; 
monotonically increasing: ΔXmax,t ≥ 0  
 
Xcut, t  = cumulative falls in the logarithmic value of the variable; monotonically 
decreasing: ΔXcut,t ≤ 0  
 
Xrec, t  = cumulative sub maximum rises in the logarithmic value of the variable; 
monotonically increasing: ΔXrec,t ≥ 0  
 
Therefore, a variable e.g. P or Y, can be presented in the form: 
 
 𝑋𝑡 = 𝑋1 + 𝑋𝑚𝑎𝑥,𝑡 + 𝑋𝑐𝑢𝑡,𝑡  +  𝑋𝑟𝑒𝑐,𝑡 (5) 
   
Illustration of the decomposition clearly indicates the effect it has on the series. Over the time 
period of study (1980-2012), the decomposition of price is depicted in Figure 5. Equally, 
income decomposition can be illustrated as in Figure 6 for the UK. 
 
Therefore, equation (4) can be now expressed to account for asymmetric prices and income. 
The base asymmetric specification is presented as:  
 
 𝐷𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 +  𝛼1𝑌𝑚𝑎𝑥,𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽1𝑌𝑐𝑢𝑡,𝑖,𝑡  +  𝛽2𝑌𝑟𝑒𝑐,𝑖,𝑡+ 𝛼3𝑃𝑚𝑎𝑥,𝑡 +  𝛽3𝑃𝑐𝑢𝑡,𝑡
+ 𝛽4𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑐,𝑡 + +𝛾𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜃𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
 
(6) 
The model will account for period of declines in price and income, which may not 
produce significant changes because of the nature of technological development (Hogan, 
1993). Elasticities for Model (6) will be estimated using the parameter on 𝑌𝑚𝑎𝑥,𝑖,𝑡 and 𝑃𝑚𝑎𝑥,𝑖,𝑡, 
as in Gately and Huntington (2002).  
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Figure 4: Price response functions (oil price versus demand). 
Source: Author panel data 
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Figure 5: Decomposition of oil price in the period 1980-2012 
 
 
Figure 6: Decomposition of UK income in the period 1980-2012 
 
4.4 Estimation Technique 
 
Following Gately and Huntington (2002) we analyse multiple specifications of the 
model to compare the elasticities obtained. In order to establish difference between developed 
and developing nations a separate panel will be estimated for each group of countries. The 
definition of developing and developed countries for the purpose of this paper is as defined in 
Appendix 1, the decision for classification is based upon the average GDP per capita in that 
country over the period of the study. The use of two separate panels not only improves the 
efficiency of estimation over separate time series regressions, but also helps to correct mis-
specification caused by cross-sectional heterogeneity (Fawcett and Price, 2012). 
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 We use Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) method to estimate our models. Hamilton 
(2003) suggests that OLS provides high quality estimation for oil demand models. In addition, 
cross-country fixed effects will be used. This estimates a different intercept variable 
(constant) for each country and is used to regulate static differences in countries (van 
Benthem and Romani, 2009). The intercept in a fixed effects model (FEM) is assumed to be 
time invariant, and consequently the slope coefficients do not change over time (Gujarati, 
2003). One may consider each country to have a heterogeneous starting demand. This would 
theoretically fit with the FEM. The suitability of this approach is tested using the Redundant 
Fixed Effects – Likelihood Ratio. 
Initially, we estimate symmetric static models and then a dynamic element will be 
introduced through the introduction of a lagged term. If this is statistically significant it will 
provide further insight into the responsiveness of oil demand. The use of asymmetric 
decomposition for both price and income will be considered. The suitability of the approach 
will be tested using a Wald test. The preferred model for each panel will be established after 
consideration of the economic merit and statistical significance. 
 A dynamic panel model with fixed effects can cause bias in the results (Webb, 2006). 
Individual (country) FE is suggested to give unreliable estimates as the number FE estimators 
tend to infinity when time period is fixed (Nickell, 1981). The FE yields significant 
importance in this analysis as it controls for bias from omitted variables (Wooldridge, 2010). 
Even through the separation of country groups there still exists heterogeneity between the 
groups. Estimations without FE produce elasticities that are unrealistically large. However, 
with a sufficiently long panel in time dimension, e.g. when T=30, average bias is reduced 
drastically, although the model is not the most efficient estimation (Judson and Owen, 1999). 
Consequently, FE is suggested to be the most suitable approach for estimation. 
 An alternative panel data estimation, a first-differenced generalised moment model 
(GMM) instead of using OLS, could increase model efficiency (Judson and Owen, 1999). 
Arellano and Bond (1991) proposed the GMM method for dealing with bias in dynamic panel 
data models. This has been applied to a study of OECD energy demand, but found similar 
elasticities to previous studies (Lui, 2004). Therefore, despite the potential for bias the 
country FE approach used in this model has been suitable and explains the prevalence of 
previous studies following this estimation technique. 
 
4.5 Data 
 
The data employed consists of 562 observations for 16 countries over the period 1980-
2012. These countries account for over 65 percent of oil demand in 2012; 32 percent of the 
consumption is from just the USA and China. Less developed countries (LDCs) in 1980 
accounted for 7.9 percent, but in 2012 made up 21.9 percent of the global demand. Figure 7 
shows a positive relationship between growth in income and growth in oil demand. A notable 
deviation from the linear trend is India. Based upon the growth in energy consumption in 
India, a higher level of GDP growth would be expected and signals potential energy 
inefficiency in these countries. Nonetheless, we expect to find a positive relationship between 
income and oil demand. Table 4 shows an overview of the data used in this study. 
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Figure 7: Average growth in GDP per capita and oil consumption (1980-2012).  
Source: Authors’ panel data 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: Summary of data 
Country 
Oil Demand per Capita (mbd) GDP per Capita (2012 USD) 
1980 2012 Av. Growth 1980 2012 Av. Growth 
Brazil 
Canada 
China 
France 
Germany 
India 
Italy 
Japan 
Korea 
Mexico 
Netherlands 
Norway 
Spain 
Turkey 
UK 
USA 
1,163 
1,898 
1,690 
3,020 
3,020 
644 
1,930 
4,905 
476 
1,048 
780 
199 
1,044 
295 
1,647 
17,062 
2,805 
2,412 
10,221 
2,358 
2,358 
3,652 
1,345 
4,714 
2,458 
2,074 
933 
247 
1,278 
685 
1,468 
18,555 
1.10% 
-0.56% 
4.61% 
-1.44% 
-0.94% 
3.59% 
-1.50% 
-0.46% 
4.22% 
0.34% 
-0.02% 
-0.11% 
0.08% 
0.84% 
-0.73% 
-0.85% 
1,931 
10,934 
193 
12,500 
11,746 
271 
8,148 
9,308 
1,674 
2,763 
12,775 
15,595 
6,037 
1,567 
9,623 
12,598 
11,340 
52,219 
6,091 
39,772 
41,863 
1,489 
33,072 
46,720 
22,590 
9,749 
45,955 
99,558 
28,624 
10,666 
39,093 
51,749 
7.04% 
5.23% 
11.76% 
4.25% 
4.72% 
5.82% 
5.12% 
5.74% 
9.32% 
5.53% 
4.67% 
6.34% 
5.76% 
7.44% 
4.93% 
4.54% 
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5. Results and Analysis 
5.1 Results 
5.1.1 Symmetric Models 
We first use a simple model to estimate the basic relationship in each country group is 
estimated (equation 2). Table 5 reports the first set of results. In the static model, developing 
countries have larger income and price elasticities of demand, 0.40 and -0.14 respectively. In 
developed countries, income elasticity is 0.01 (statistically insignificant) and price elasticity is 
-0.04. A clear difference in elasticities for the two panels is evident. The estimation suggests 
developing countries are more responsive to oil price rises. This is contrary to the literature. 
Yet, the model does estimate income growth to be fuelling oil demand, consistent with a 
priori expectations.  
The addition of the lag term (equation 4) alters the elasticity results. The long-term 
income elasticity falls to 0.49 in developing economies and rises to 0.11 in developed 
economies. Interestingly the dynamic model results do not differ greatly from the static model 
in developed countries, this could be due to the mature energy profile unlike developing 
economies that are on a steep growth trajectory. The lagged term has significant advantage for 
econometric analysis by accounting for long-term elasticities, and hence will be utilised in 
future regressions. 
 
Table 5: Results for Models (2) and (4) 
Variable Developing Developed 
Equation 2 4 2 4 
Constant 
Y 
P 
D(t-1) 
-3.564 (-24.93)** 
0.404 (23.08)** 
-0.140 (-5.73)** 
- 
-0.2686 (-3.06)** 
0.0414 (4.07)** 
-0.030 (-3.612)** 
0.9157 (43.22)** 
-0.6512 (6.22)** 
0.0146 (1.46) 
-0.0384 (-3.8)** 
- 
0.0757 (1.79)* 
0.0123 (3.04)** 
-0.0357 (-8.82)** 
0.8910 (39.91)** 
FEM 
Observations 
Countries 
Yes 
198 
6 
Yes 
192 
6 
Yes 
330 
10 
Yes 
320 
10 
R2 
R2 (adjusted) 
F-statistic 
Jarque-Bera 
Durbin Watson 
AR(2) 
Redundant FE  
Hausman RE 
0.973 
0.972 
967.22** 
6.178* 
0.245** 
- 
166.178** 
0.000 
0.998 
0.998 
9434.77** 
8.824** 
- 
1.243 
5.861** 
11.426** 
0.907 
0.904 
282.69** 
25.559** 
0.488** 
- 
319.300** 
0.000 
0.987 
0.986 
1865.56** 
515.418** 
- 
1.872 
3.241** 
23.876** 
𝜖𝑌 
𝜖𝑃 
0.404 
-0.140 
0.491 
-0.356 
0.015 
-0.038 
0.113 
-0.328 
i) t-statistics are in parenthesis 
ii) Elasticities 𝜖𝑌 and 𝜖𝑃 are long-term elasticities and are comparable  
**1% significance level; *5% significance 
 
 
The main consideration from the symmetric models is to establish the correct panel 
data estimation technique. The Hausman test is found to be inconclusive in equation (2) for 
both country groups, and the use of random effects is strongly rejected in the dynamic model. 
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The use of fixed effects is strongly supported by the Redundant Fixed Effects Likelihood ratio 
for both equations (2) and (4). Accordingly, in all future estimations fixed effects will be 
applied as it fits statistically and theoretically with the approach undertaken. 
5.1.2 Asymmetric Models 
Theoretical and empirical support for the application of asymmetric response 
functions is established earlier. Econometric analysis using decomposition of the income and 
price series (equation 6) yields more noteworthy results that can be applied to the recent price 
shock. Table 6 provides the estimation and diagnostic tests.  
The initial estimation combines both income and price decompositions in one model. 
In both panels the Wald test finds that the use of decomposition is not redundant. The Pmax 
term is the largest elasticity for both country groups. The difference in long-run price 
elasticities is less than 0.03, with both groups adjusting demand similarly. The elasticities for 
Pcut illustrate energy maturity in developed countries, with elasticity of -0.03 compared to -
0.05 in developing countries. Hence if price fell by $10/barrel, in the short-run, developing 
countries will ceteris paribus, demand an additional 1.04mbd in excess of developed 
economies. 
 
Table 6: Results for Model (6) 
i) t-statistics are in parenthesis 
ii) Elasticities 𝜖𝑌 and 𝜖𝑃 are long-term elasticities and are comparable  
**1% significance level; *5% significance 
 
 
For developing countries, the largest income elasticity is when income falls (Ycut) with 
an elasticity of 0.16, indicating that falls in income have the strongest effect on oil demand. 
Over the time period most income rises in developing countries are increases in the maximum 
value (i.e. Ymax). Long-run income elasticity based on this variable is 0.43. Contrasting to 
Variable Developing Developed 
Constant 
Ymax 
Ycut 
Yrec 
Pmax 
Pcut 
Prec 
D(t-1) 
-0.1829 (-5.01)** 
0.0591 (3.34)** 
0.1642 (5.68)** 
0.0308 (1.05) 
-0.0473 (-1.47)* 
-0.053 (-4.47)** 
-0.017 (-1.36) 
0.8641 (36.37)** 
0.0480 (2.74)** 
0.0270 (2.06)* 
0.0852 (2.67)** 
0.0799 (2.09)* 
-0.0573 (-2.95)** 
-0.0281 (-3.65)** 
-0.0313 (-4.97)** 
0.8731 (35.31)** 
Country Fixed Effect (FE) 
Observations 
Countries 
Yes 
192 
6 
Yes 
320 
10 
R2 
R2 (adjusted) 
F-statistic 
Jarque-Bera 
Redundant FE Likelihood 
AR(2) 
Wald Test 
0.998 
0.998 
7455.12** 
4.769* 
7.48** 
0.911 
24.67** 
0.987 
0.986 
1420.00** 
677.616** 
3.72** 
1.89 
27.78** 
𝜖𝑌 
𝜖𝑃 
0.435 
-0.348 
0.213 
-0.389 
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developed economies, increases in the maximum income are not as strong and shows maturity 
in the energy cycle. This yields a long-run elasticity of 0.21. Thus, the developing countries 
demand for oil is fuelled significantly by income growth. 
The models do not pass autocorrelation tests indicating that the variables are 
correlated over time. This could be due to misspecification by the use of two decomposed 
time-series. In fact, van Bentham and Romani (2009) have issues with autocorrelation and re-
specification helped reduce the effect. 
5.1.3 Adjustments to the decomposed model  
As previously highlighted the models suffer from autocorrelation. Accordingly, two 
variations on equation (6) will be presented, each with one decomposed series (price or 
income). Re-specification can be used to correct for autocorrelation (Gujarati, 2003). This is 
because inference may occur between the two decomposed series if included in one model. 
 
𝐷𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 +  𝛼1𝑌𝑖,𝑡+ 𝛼2𝑃𝑚𝑎𝑥,𝑡 +  𝛽3𝑃𝑐𝑢𝑡,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑐,𝑡 + +𝛾𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜃𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡  (6p) 
 
 𝐷𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 𝛼1𝑌𝑚𝑎𝑥,𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽1𝑌𝑐𝑢𝑡,𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑌𝑟𝑒𝑐,𝑖,𝑡+ 𝛼2𝑃𝑡 + +𝛾𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜃𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 (6y) 
 
Estimation of the improved equations is presented in Table 7. The models still suffer 
from autocorrelation in developing countries and non-normality in developed economies. 
However, the significance is lower and therefore Models (6p) and (6y) are better specified to 
highlight differences between the elasticities in the two panels. The non-normality in 
developed economies can be attributed to outliers for the UK in 1984 and 1985 which 
significantly deviates from the fitted line (see Figure 8). This might have been in part due to 
the miners’ strike which caused greater dependency on oil (Ledger and Sallis, 1995). This 
could be controlled using a dummy variable, but the inference on the estimated parameters is 
low. 
The partial use of asymmetry in equations (6y) and (6p) yield elasticities that indicate 
the substantial disparity between the two country groups for income elasticity. In equation 
(6y) income elasticity is 0.67 in developing and 0.18 in developed economies. The 
decomposition indicates short-run income elasticity to be nearly four times larger in 
developing countries when there is an increase in the series-maxima. The effect of a price 
shock that increases the series-maxima (Pmax) is insignificant in developing countries, thus 
indicating the price shock had little statistical importance on consumption.  
Across all regressions the income elasticity is approximately 0.2 in developed 
economies and between 0.5-0.7 in developing economies. Demand has tended to adjust more 
to increases, rather than decreases in price, except in one instance for developing economies. 
The price elasticity is generally stronger in developed countries indicating clear differences 
between the country groups and the driving factors behind their demand across the time 
period. The heterogeneity between the two panels has implications on policy and in 
understanding the recent price shock. 
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Table 7: Results for Models (6y) and (6p) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
i) t-
statist
ics 
are in 
parent
hesis 
ii) Elasticities 𝜖𝑌 and 𝜖𝑃 are long-term elasticities and are comparable  
**1% significance level; *5% significance 
 
 
Figure 8: Residual plot for Model (6y), developing countries. 
 
 
Variable Developing Developed 
Model 6y 6p 6y 6p 
Constant 
Y 
Ymax 
Ycut 
Yrec 
P 
Pmax 
Pcut 
Prec 
D(t-1) 
-0.011 (-0.36) 
 
0.081 (6.22)** 
0.141 (5.24)** 
0.052 (1.87)* 
-0.037 (-4.68)** 
 
 
 
0.878 (38.51)** 
-0.669(-5.30)** 
0.081 (5.21)** 
 
 
 
 
-0.045 (-1.35) 
-0.016 (-1.60) 
-0.047 (-4.20)** 
0.912 (43.69)** 
0.195 (8.80)** 
 
0.021 (3.41)** 
0.093 (3.03)** 
0.079 (2.19)* 
-0.034 (-8.22)** 
 
 
 
0.886 (39.69)** 
-0.262 (-2.43)* 
0.033 (2.75)** 
 
 
 
 
-0.065 (-3.46)** 
-0.023 (-3.49)** 
-0.033 (-5.89)** 
0.867 (35.38)** 
Country FE 
Observations 
Countries 
Yes 
192 
6 
Yes 
192 
6 
Yes 
320 
10 
Yes 
320 
10 
R2 
R2 (adjusted) 
F-statistic 
Jarque-Bera 
Redundant FE 
AR(2) 
Wald Test 
0.998 
0.998 
8811.83** 
3.750 
6.528** 
1.30 
4.96** 
0.998 
0.998 
7928.85** 
5.70* 
7.55** 
1.43 
2.23 
0.987 
0.986 
1625.78** 
674.92** 
3.60** 
1.84 
8.97** 
0.987 
0.986 
1616.21** 
595.08** 
3.901** 
1.97* 
48.07** 
𝜖𝑌 
𝜖𝑃 
0.668 
-0.303 
0.921 
-0.511 
0.184 
-0.298 
0.248 
-0.489 
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The preferred models for further analysis are Model (6y) for developing countries and 
Model (6p) for developed countries. In developing countries, consistent with a priori 
expectations the key driver for demand has been income. Model (6y) suitably captures this 
and allows consideration of the income effect. In developed countries, more stable growth has 
had less effect on oil consumption, thus price plays a greater role on consumption patterns. 
Consequently, Model (6p) will be used. The crucial elasticities are indicated in Table 8. 
 
Table 8: Crucial elasticities 
Panel Income Elasticity Price Elasticity 
Developing 
Developed 
0.668 
0.248 
-0.303 
-0.489 
 
5.2 Income and Substitution Effect 
 
Income elasticity is significantly closer to unity in comparison to developed 
economies. This indicates a dependency on oil for economic development. Yet, if oil is a key 
driver in development, why is consumption in developing countries affected significantly less 
in the event of an oil price shock? One might consider this in the context of energy intensity 
and the structure of industry in the countries. 
Analysis of the decomposed price Model (6p) shows a insignificant parameter for 
Pmax. This indicates that developing countries have been unaffected by the price shock; as the 
Pmax term is only activated during the period of price shock. Additionally, considering the 
model with both series decomposed (6) in the lead up to the price shock (Prec) the short-term 
demand adjustment is only about 1.7 percent and nearly one-half of that of developed 
economies. 
The strong income effect in developing countries indicates that they are to a lesser 
degree affected by the price of oil. Calculation of the Slutsky equation for each panel of 
countries provides indication of the compensated demand for oil, and thus indicates the 
relative income and substitution effects.2 Table 9 shows that the income effect is 6.3 times 
stronger in developing countries showing income growth is fuelling oil demand. Additionally, 
the substitution effect is 2.08 larger in developed countries indicating a larger responsiveness 
to the price shock. 
 
                                                 
2 The Slutsky equation allows derivation of income and substitution effects based upon the elasticities 
obtained and the equation in elasticity form can be expressed as: 
𝜀𝑖𝑖 = 𝜎𝑖𝑖 − 𝑠𝑖𝜂𝑖 
where 𝜀𝑖𝑖 denotes price elasticity of demand (i.e. 𝛼2), the share of oil expenditure as percentage GDP 
(calculated from panel), 𝜂𝑖  is income elasticity of demand (𝛼1), 𝜎𝑖𝑖  denotes substitution effect, and 
income effect is 𝑠𝑖𝜂𝑖. 
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Table 9: Income and substitution effects (derived from crucial elasticities) 
Country Group 
Oil Spending 
(% Income) 
Income Effect Sub. Effect 
Developing 
Developed 
11.09 
4.77 
0.074 
0.011 
-0.229 
-0.478 
 
 
5.3 Explanations for Variation in Consumption Patterns 
 Income in developing countries has increased on average by seven per cent in the time 
period studied. The compound effect of this is a doubling of national income, this major 
change in economic activity is sure to cause changes in consumption patterns and provides an 
explanation to the strength of the income effect in developing countries. Nonetheless, the 
current per capita oil consumption is still very low and any growth in disposable income will 
increase oil demand further. 
 Behr (2009) regards the increases in oil demand to have had a disproportionate effect 
on global oil prices. One of the main components fuelling the surge was the increased demand 
for transport fuel and in particular diesel for the Asian market (Yergin, 2008). In order to 
sustain this oil demand will have to increase by 128 million barrels a year (Petrie, 2011). 
Projecting oil demand to 2035, the key driver of oil demand will be transport fuels and 
expected to account for 40 percent of the overall demand increase (IEA, 2012). They expect 
road freight in non-OECD countries to grow nine-times in part due to increased construction 
and industrial activity. 
Growing economies require large amounts of infrastructure creation. Such projects are 
linked with income growth and this is a good indication as to why the income effect is so 
large in developing countries. Barclays (2012) report that most developing economies are in a 
stage of rapid development and creation of infrastructure, with demand outstripping supply on 
these projects. The construction of motorways in these countries will make car ownership 
more appealing so increasing fuel demand. 
 One could consider that during a period of rapid economic growth in developing 
countries little regard was paid to energy efficient technologies. The data used in this paper 
shows that developing countries use 3.6 times more oil per unit of GDP than developed 
economies. Inefficient use of energy in developing countries caused levels of consumption 
that could otherwise have kept global prices lower (Merrill Lynch, 2012). However, energy 
intensity has been declining in all regions globally in part attributed to China becoming less 
energy-intensive recently (BP, 2013). 
Asian developing countries often have price controls which prevent the transmission 
of crude prices rises in order for the country to continue on an uninterrupted growth 
trajectory. Price controls reduce the substitution effect as there is less incentive to be more 
energy efficient in the face of price increases (Economist, 2008). The monetary size of fuel 
subsidies is large. In 2013, India spent $23bn in reducing fuel costs (Mallett, 2014). If pump 
costs were reflective of the global price of oil consumers may have reduced oil demand and 
the price shock could have been dampened. However, as this paper uses a single price we are 
unable to further analyse these effects. 
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In contrast, developed countries already have a mature energy profile. Oil is primarily 
used as a transportation fuel, with electricity production now undertaken using other fossil 
fuels or alternative forms of energy (Merrill Lynch, 2012). The consumer faces the brunt of 
oil price shocks in economies where transportation fuel is the primary use of oil, as crude 
prices are easily transferred to the pumps. This is the case in most OECD countries, with 
minimal fuel subsidies in place (Economist, 2008). Therefore, the substitution effect is likely 
to be greater. Indeed, the USA witnessed a slowdown in automobile purchases in 2008 in 
light of higher oil prices (Hamilton, 2009).  
 The difference in consumption patterns between the two panels is noteworthy due to 
three factors. Firstly, growth has caused a structural change to the developing economies. The 
move to greater personal transportation shows no sign of slowing and consumers are unlikely 
to reverse their lifestyle because of fuel price increase if incomes continue to rise. The income 
effect is greater in developing countries as the middle classes seek higher standard of living. 
In contrast, developed countries have mature energy profiles and have little rationale to 
rapidly increase long-term transport fuel demand. Secondly, the rapid expansion may have 
neglected energy saving. If alternative energy forms were in place there would be a greater 
substitution effect from a shock in developing countries. It is possible as concerns with air 
pollution and climate change continue alternative transport fuels are promoted more strongly 
as with compressed natural gas in South Asia. Finally, oil subsidies prevent the transmission 
of global prices hence fuelling consumption and biasing the substitution effect downwards in 
the developing economies. 
 
5.4 Policy Implications 
 
 Preventing spikes in oil prices is difficult to achieve due to the complex nature of the 
market as highlighted in this paper. Nonetheless, economic policy could be used to smooth 
prices based upon the work of Behr (2009) and Wurzel et al. (2009). This paper has a number 
of policy recommendations.  
 Oil intensity has reduced significantly in China and other developing countries (Figure 
9). The indicator provides a measure of consumption per unit of output in the economy. 
Reducing oil intensity acts as a safeguard if oil prices do increase, as spare capacity exists 
within the economy (Wurzel et al., 2009). They note in the event of a demand shock as 
witnessed in the last oil price shock lower energy intensity would have reduced the impact of 
rising incomes. The need to lower intensity is also a recommendation reported by Gately and 
Huntington (2002). This paper has found a strong link between economic development and 
increased oil consumption. Unless intensity reduces, the potential for future demand shocks 
will still exist. 
As noted, income growth at earlier stages of economic development leads to strong 
growth in demand for energy and oil in particular. The demand growth has trade balance, 
security of supply, and air pollution as well greenhouse gas emissions implications. In both 
developing and developed countries, given the high socio-economic costs of these, policy 
makers can adapt polices that meet the demand for energy services while at the same time 
these are met from renewable energy, new technologies, and energy efficiency measures. The 
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potential for these measures are particularly high in developing countries. At the same time, 
many developing economies continue to subsidise the use of oil and other energy sources. 
Instead, these countries can use energy subsidy reforms to increase the efficiency of energy 
use and redirect this to alternative sources of fuel. 
 This paper has highlighted the difference in consumption patterns between the two 
panels. Clearly demand functions differ based on the level of development in an economy, 
therefore policies cannot be globally homogenous. Each panel exhibits different responses 
when asymmetric decomposition is applied. Global elasticities could therefore be biased and 
thus incorrect policy decisions would be made. Each country has specific energy mix and 
varied uses of oil. OECD countries use 80 percent of their oil consumption for transportation. 
This value is around 15 percent lower in developing economies (Merrill Lynch, 2012). 
Consequently, blanket reduction policy cannot be applied. International collaborations and 
policies can be devised to address region specific issues. 
 
 
Figure 9: Global oil intensity  
Source: BP (2013) 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
This paper investigated price and income elasticities in a period of global oil price 
volatility. A scarcity of research has been undertaken in light of the recent price shock. 
Previous studies had introduced the use of asymmetric decomposition and cross country panel 
analysis, but the techniques had not been applied to a dataset that covered the recent price 
volatility. Analysis of late has concentrated on a time-series approach and this has failed to 
capture the efficiency gains obtained from panel data. 
Currently in Epoch III oil pricing, the previously established global trade flows appear 
to be changing. Fundamental economic analysis established the price rises following the 
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millennium to have occurred as a result of disequilibrium. Supply hiatus from non-OPEC 
producers coupled with geopolitical events resulted in supply growth stalling. The recent 
price shock was characterised not by a supply shock as in previous episodes, but rather a 
failure to escalate production to satisfy demand. Unexpected levels of demand were the 
primary contributing factor in causing the disequilibrium. 
A dynamic cross country fixed effects specification was used to capture the 
heterogeneous intercept level of demand in each country. As the period of study was greater 
than thirty-years the potential for parameter bias resulting from FE was substantially reduced. 
Estimation of the models including asymmetric decomposition for both income and price 
yielded two distinct consumption patterns. Firstly, the effect of income falls is larger than 
income rises, with income elasticities being stronger for developing countries in all 
specifications. Secondly, when oil price rises the elasticity is larger in contrast to price falls, 
but this effect is only significant in developed countries. 
Subsequent analysis of these observations through the use of Slutsky decomposition 
emphasised the results obtained in the regression. Developing countries have an income effect 
which is 6.3 times larger than in developed countries. Thus, in a period of significant 
economic growth for developing countries it is evident why oil consumption increased so 
dramatically. Moreover, the substitution effect in developed economies was 2.1 stronger than 
in developing countries. This explains the more responsive adjustment of consumption of 
developed countries in reaction to the price shock of 2007/08. 
The results obtained are explainable in relation to the difference in economic structure 
between the two panels. Developing countries have not yet reached relative energy maturity 
in relation to fossil fuels. Consumers increasingly use oil as a transportation fuel as the higher 
disposable income is expended on car ownership. This explains the relative strength of the 
income effect in developing countries. Economic development has been at the expense of 
lower energy efficiency, in turn reinforcing the size of the income effect in developing 
countries. We suggested the implementation of oil-intensity reduction policy in order to 
maximise efficiency. Such policy would enable a buffering if oil prices rise as a result of a 
demand shock. A crucial policy consideration postulated is the recognition of heterogeneous 
consumption patterns between country groups and that a one size fits all policy should not be 
undertaken. 
There is potential for future research. This paper considered two independent panels 
separated by the level of economic development. However, by increasing the dataset and 
incorporation of more countries, alternative panels could be estimated. These could include 
oil importers, oil exporters and geographical regions. Granulation of the current approach 
would allow more tailored policy development and a better understanding of income and 
price responses which would aid economic forecasting. Furthermore, research could be 
considered into the effect of subsidies on consumption by utilising country price data. 
This paper has contributed to the existing literature on oil consumption patterns during 
Epoch III pricing. The dominance of the income effect in developing countries has been 
staggering. In conclusion, oil consumption patterns during the period 1980-2012 varied 
significantly between developing and developed countries and failure to account for this will 
bias the effectiveness of energy policies. 
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Appendix 1: Country Groups 
 
Tables 10 and 11 outline the classification of developed and developing country applied in 
this study. The study has separated the countries based on their GDP per capita into these 
country groups. The difficulty in obtaining data for low income (developing country) reduces 
the number of available countries of analysis. Note that Korea is included among the 
developing countries as the economy featured characteristics of a developing economy for 
much of the period under study. 
 
 
Table 10: Developing country group 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 11: Developed country group 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Country GDP Growth Rate Demand Growth 
Brazil 
China 
India 
Korea 
Mexico 
Turkey 
7.04% 
11.76% 
5.82% 
9.32% 
5.53% 
7.44% 
1.10% 
4.61% 
3.59% 
4.22% 
0.34% 
0.84% 
Average 7.82% 2.45% 
Country GDP Growth Rate Demand Growth 
Canada 
France 
Germany 
Italy 
Japan 
Netherlands 
Norway 
Spain 
UK 
USA 
5.23% 
4.25% 
4.72% 
5.12% 
5.74% 
4.67% 
6.34% 
5.76% 
4.93% 
4.54% 
-0.56% 
-1.44% 
-0.94% 
-1.50% 
-0.46% 
-0.02% 
-0.11% 
0.08% 
-0.73% 
-0.85% 
Average 5.13% -0.65% 
